Expert's View: Reviewing What Went Wrong

An interview with David E. Daniel, PhD, PE, president, University of Texas at Dallas and chair of the American Society of Civil Engineers External Review Panel.

The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel was formed to provide technical input and review of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) analysis of Hurricane Katrina and its impact on New Orleans. ASCE recently released The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System: What Went Wrong and Why. Dr. David E. Daniel talked with PBS&J Highlights about the report and what it reveals.

PBS&J: What is the number one lesson that we've learned from the Hurricane Protection System failures in New Orleans?

Daniel: The members of the Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel—14 experts in key engineering and scientific disciplines related to hurricane protection—were unanimous in our belief that we must place the protection of public safety, health, and welfare at the forefront of our nation's priorities. To do anything less would lead to a far greater tragedy than the one we've witnessed in
New Orleans.

PBS&J: Do we now know definitively what went wrong during Hurricane Katrina?

Daniel: We have a good understanding of the direct, physical causes of the catastrophe. The levees were engineered structures intended to protect people from high water. That was the very disaster they failed to prevent. These engineering failures were complex and involved numerous decisions by many people within many organizations over a long
period of time.

PBS&J: Are we able to make the necessary changes that will prevent it from happening again?

Daniel: This is tougher. Behind the direct causes of the levee failures were myriad indirect causes that will be more difficult to address. Overcoming the deficiencies in the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System—and instituting real change in its engineering, management, and governance—will require leadership, courage, conviction, and funding.

PBS&J: Were there any specific revelations that personally had an affect on you and the External Review Panel while writing this report?

Daniel: We were deeply saddened by the devastation caused by the Hurricane Protection System failures, particularly because we—and our profession—have made a commitment to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public. We now see that questionable engineering decisions and management choices, and inadequate interfaces within and between organizations, all contributed to the problem.

PBS&J: What does the future hold for New Orleans?

Daniel: We commend the USACE for its recently released Risk and Reliability Report, which shows—neighborhood by neighborhood—the effects of system improvements on risk and vulnerability. The people of New Orleans—and all those who live in hurricane- and flood-prone communities around the country— must understand and acknowledge the risks under which they live. From this knowledge comes insight into what risks are acceptable for their communities and for the nation.