Planning for Security:
A Tiered Approach to Risk Management

* By Susan Ballard-Hirsch, Government Services Integrated Process Team LLC Dr. Mike Chipley, PBS&J, representing FEMA/DHS, and Bill Schroeder, ESRI

Because it is impossible to protect ourselves against all threats and hazards, we must adopt a balanced approach to security that considers intended functions, aesthetics, and operations, as well as first and life cycle costs or sustainability. An integrated, multitiered process approach is required to find appropriate and economical solutions to reducing risk.

A geographic information system can be used to quickly generate, test, and evaluate alternative vulnerability scenarios and Level of Protection based on the Design Basis Threat.

Assess the vulnerability of a facility from an off-site position, considering topography, vegetation, and adjacent land uses. A process and procedures should be established for tracking and making deliveries, identifying drivers, and clearing unknown drivers.

When evaluating the strength and characteristics of the perimeter consider visibility, boundary definition, approach, access, boundary strength, and setbacks or standoff distances of potential targets. Road alignment and geometry affect the speed a potential terrorist could use to obtain access. Natural features—ditches, berms, water, dense woods—can deter entry.

How close can a vehicle bomb be placed to the target and what is the route to the target? A direct route gives the perpetrator faster access than one that requires turns and stops. Other distance considerations include building adjacencies or separation distances. Trash receptacles/dumpsters, storage buildings, landscaping, street furniture, and site amenities also come into play.

Exterior considerations include the size and type of construction, height of the building, and structural framework design. The materials that comprise the exterior walls and glazing are also important factors. Consider the approaches to the building as well as those to the roof and air intakes. Assess who or what controls access to the building as well as lighting and other means of observation and detection.

Interior design and layout figure into a facility’s vulnerabilities. Interior partitions, walls, and suspended ceilings can pose a hazard to occupants if not secured. Preventing progressive collapse is a primary objective.

The location and vulnerability of egress plays a role in minimizing casualties immediately after an event. Centrally located mailrooms with no hardened interior wall separation increase the potential for damage in the case of a mail bomb. Integrated security and emergency systems as well as defined protocol can reduce vulnerability.

Before selecting a particular countermeasure to mitigate a threat or consequence, the team should develop a set of performance goals to ensure that the end result achieves the intended purpose—be it saving of lives, continuity of business / mission, reduced reconstitution times, or the criteria identified as important within the tolerance for risk. A combination of interrelated countermeasures may deter an action better than an application of multiple yet independent countermeasures

* Text adapted from a presentation delivered to the opening plenary session, the American Society of Landscape Architects, Chicago, July 26, 2004. The paper is available at www.asla.org/abstracts.